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THE second class of liens which it is proposed to consider are
those which arise by virtue of the municipal law, but which are
enforceable in the adiiralty.
The most noteworthy causes of this character are those arising
from the liens of material men for services rendered in the "home
port" of the vessel.
The maritime law of the United States is that, if repairs have
been made or necessaries furnished to a ship in the port of a state
to which she does not belong, or to a foreign ship, the material-
man's lien is dependent wholly on the principles of the general mar-
itime law, and he may, irrespective of the municipal law, proceed
in rem to enforce it in any District Court of the United States
which may, by seizure of the vessel, obtain jurisdiction. So far
then do we follow the general maritime law; we say to the libellant,
that the contract being maritime, he can proceed in the admiralty,
and that the usual methods of procedure, both in personam and in
rem, are open to him, but that if he elects to file a libel in rem when
no maritime lien exists, he must abide the consequences. Jurisdic-
tion and jurisprudence go hand in hand ; the existence or non-
existence of the lien is a matter of law, and is in each particular
case decided in accordance with the principles of maritime juris-
prudence. This is certainly not only good law but good logic.
But, on the other band, if the repairs have been made or neces-
saries furnished to a ship in the port of a state to which she
belongs, technically known as her "home port," the question
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of lien or no lien is no longer determinable by maritime jurispru-
dence, but by local municipal law; and though the contract be
maritime, though the repairs be made on the credit of the ship,
the material-man has no lien other than that which is given him
by the local law; we do not deprive him of his right to sue in the
admiralty, we do not declare his contract to be no longer mari-
time, but we say that his rights as a lien claimant must depend on
the municipal law and not on the law maritime.
The father of this curious offspring was The General Smith, 4
Wheat. 438.1
The immediate effect of the decision of the" Supreme Court in the
case of The General Smith was to restrict the suitor to a personal
action, whether prosecuted in the admiralty or common-law courts.
He had his common-law lien, but this was valueless without that
possession which was impracticable if not impossible. Realizing
this, the legislatures of the several states came to his relief: acts
creating maritime liens, or liens in the nature of maritime liens en-
forceable by actions in the state courts, were passed by the several
state legislatures. When the constitutionality of those several acts
was tested, they were closely scrutinized, and whenever they put-
ported to create a maritime lien, they were declared unconstitu-
tional, and when they fell within these limits and were but quasi
.maritime in character, their enforcement in the state courts was
prohibited: The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624 ; The uses Tayflor, 4 Id. 411.
After various modifications of the admiralty rule, the question
in 1874 again came squarely before the Supreme Court, and it
was held that no maritime lien existed for repairs made in the
home port of the vessel, but that so long as Congress does not
interpose to regulate the subject, the rights of material-men fur-
nishing necessaries to a vessel in her home port may be regulated
in each state by state legislation.
State laws, it was said, cannot exclude the contract for furnish-
ing such necessaries from the domain of admiralty jurisdiction, nor
iHeld, that in respect t necessaries and repairs in the port of a state to which
the ship belongs, the case is governed by the municipal law of that state, and that
no lien is implied unless it is recognised by that law. It is noticeable that at the
time that this case was decided, the Supreme Court were of the opinion that the
admiralty jurisdiction was commensurate with the commercial clause in the Consti-
tution, and that it therefore did not extend to contracts of affreightment between
two ports in the same state, nor to supplies furnished to a vessel engaged in such
trade. From this position they have long since receded: The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624.
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can they confer such jurisdiction upon state courts as to enable
them to proceed in rem for the enforcement of liens created by state
laws, but the District Court of the United States having jurisdic-
tion of the contract as a maritime one, may enforce liens given for
its security even when created by state laws: The Lottawanna, 21
Wall. 558 ; see also, The John T. Moore, 3 Wood's R. 61.
Nominally, The Lottawanna was decided on the doctrine of
"stare decisis," TIe General Smith was citedwith approval; in name
it was followed, it would seem, however, in principle at least, that
The Lottawanna has created a new order of things. If we under-
stand The General Smith aright, it stated the maritime law of the
United States to be that in respect to necessaries and repairs in
the port of a state to which a ship belongs, the case is governed
by the municipal law of that state, and that no lien is implied
unless it is recognised by that law. If we understand The Lotta-
wanna aright, it states the maritime law of the United States to be
that in respect to necessaries and supplies furnished to a. ship in
the port of a state to which she belongs, there exists no 'maritime
lien, but that, until Congress chooses to interpose, the rights of
material-men furnishing necessaries to a vessel in her "home port"
maybe regulated in each state by the state legislature. If this inter-
pretation be correct, the distinction is not only obvious but signifi-
cant; the maritime law of the United States is no longer dependent
on the municipal law, but is decisive whether the vessel be domes-
tic or foreign, and by its terms the material-man can have no
maritime lien, if the repairs be made or necessaries furnished to a
vessel in the port of a state to which the vessel belongs, but may
have a lien if the repairs be made or if the necessaries be fur-
nished in the port of a state to which she does not belong. If
the vessel be in her home port, and the state statute is sought to
be enforced in the admiralty, the requirements of the statute must
be complied with. The act should be referred to in the proceed-
ings, and if the statutory requirements are not complied with, the
admiralty court will not enforce the lien, but once the cause is
properly before the court, the principles and mode of procedure
followed in the admiralty will govern it: -Davis v. New Brig,
Gilp. 473; Boon v. Hornet, Crabbe's R. 426; In re Indiana,
Id. 479; and though the liens given by state laws may be enforced
in districts which are without the state, the order of priority given
by the statute will be disregarded if in conflict with liens having
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priority by the maritime law: Underwriters' Co. v. Katie, 3 Wood's
R. 182.
What vessels are to be accounted foreign and what domestic:
Foreign vessels are divisible into two classes, one in which the
vessel is foreign, as evidenced by her flag and enrolment, the
other in which she is foreign by reason of her having her home
port in another state. In the first class of cases, the question of
nationality is in issue; in the second, the nationality is not in
dispute, but the inquiry is in what state do her actual owners
reside, or, in other words, where is her veritable home port.
If a vessel fly a fbreign flag, have on her stern a foreign name,
and is registered as belonging to a foreigner, there can be 'no
doubt that, prima facie, she is what she purports to be, foreign.
Suppose, however, that the actual ownership and the apparent
ownership be different, not from inadvertence or neglect, but
by design. Suppose, for example, she is actually owned by an
American citizen, but that she is commanded by a foreigner, or
that she was built -in a foreign country, or that she took refuge
under foreign colors during our civil war, or is for any other cause
debarred from claining American registry.
It is plain that in such a case the legal and equitable ownership
are purposely kept apart ; that the legal owner is a man of straw, a
citizen of the flag under which she sails, and that the actual owner is
the mortgagee, who is unable to procure an American register. In
cases of this character, what is the position of the material--an
dealing with the vessel when she is at the residence of her equit-
able owner ?
The cases naturally divide themselves into two classes, viz.,
those in which he was aware of her history, and those in which he
was ignorant of it.
In the first class of cases, though the authorities are not entirely
harmonious, the more general opinion would seem *to be, that if the
vessel be at the time at the residence of her actual owner, and this
circumstance be known to the material-man, he will be concluded
thereby, and that as to him, she will be domestic even though she
fly a foreign flag, and her legal ownership, as evidenced by her
enrollment, be likewise foreign: The -. A. Bernard, 2 Fed. Rep.
712; The Alice Tainter, 5 Benedict 391; see contra, The Geo.
T. Kemp, 2 Lowell 478. But if, on the other hand, the material-
man be ignorant of the fact, the rule is otherwise, or, in other
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words, her equitable owner having held her out to the world as
foreign, will be estopped from denying her national character:
The Walicrien, 3 Benedict 394; The St. Tago de Cuba, 9 Wheat.
409.
When the nationality of the vessel is not involved, the question
may arise in this way: The citizen of one-state may make a sale
of her to the citizen of another, but from inadvertence or neglect
the change of ownership may not appear on her register. Prima
facie, the home port of the vessel is the port of her enrolment,
but when the port of her enrolment and the residence of her
actual owner are different, the rule is that the material-man dealing
with her at the residence of the true owners, knowing them to be
owners, cannot claim that the vessel was foreign because she is
registered in another state: Hill v. The Golden Gate, 1 New-
berry 308; The Plymouth Rock, 13 Blatch. 505. Though the
lion given by the general maritime law and that given by the mu-
nicipal law are both enforced in the same forum-the former, by
reason of its characteristics, universality and the ease with which
it is enforced, is in general preferable, and this is especially true
when, by reason of numerous libels filed in the cause, the question
of priority becomes important.
The general principle which governs in determining the ques-
tion of precedence between lien claimants claiming under pure
maritime law liens, is, that he whose service or expenditure has
preserved the vessel as a security for a pre-existing debt has
priority; so that, practically, the last service performed or
advance made takes precedence over all previous ones.
The services performed at the latest hour are most efficacious in
bringing the vessel and her freightage to their final destination,
each foregoing encumbrance therefore is actually benefited by
means of the succeeding encumbrance, and a court of admiralty as
a court of equity in adjudicating cases of conflicting liens of this
nature takes this as the principle of its decisions: 49 London Law
Mag. 146.
It is obvious that in the application of this principle, the very
nature of some liens will often secure to them priority over others.
The wages of the mariners earned by bringing the ship to her
destined port have insured the eventual value of all services pre-
viously rendered, and therefore obtain priority over all other liens
ex contractu, or quasi ex contractu, as for salvage, pilotage, towage
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or bottomry.' Wages antecedently earned, as in an outward or
divided voyage, or due under contract at the expiration of stipu-
lated terms, without reference to the ship's arrival at the port of
destination, will be postponed to subsequent salvage, but no such
distinction *will give bottomry bonds precedence over them: The
Constancia, 4 Weekly Notes of Oases 68. Bottomry bonds have
precedence over prior salvage, and give way to subsequent salvage,
pilotage and towage.
The lien for damages, originating in the wrong of the master
and crew of the vessel in fault, and founded on consideration of
public policy for the prevention of careless navigation, takes pre-
cedence of all liens ex contractu, and in the event of the vessel
proving insufficient to meet all the demands, the liens of wages,
towage, pilotage and bottomry will be absorbed: The Benares, 7
Weekly Notes of Cases 54; The -Enterprise, 1 Lowell 455.. A
maritime lien accrues from the instant of the happening of the
circumstance which creates it, and not from the intervention of. the
court; the latter is but a process to render perfect an inchoate
right: The Pacifi, L. R., 32 Ad. 120. From this it follows that
the mere circumstance of prior seizure, or a prior decree obtained
by superior diligence, will not affect the order of priority, when-all
the claims are pending together: The Brig E. A. Bernard, 2
Fed. Rep. 712. But see contra, The General Burnside, 3 Fed.
Rep. 228; The ehooner De Wolf, Id. 236.
As between material-men claiming under the general maritime
law and others claiming under the quasi maritime lien accorded to
them by state legislatures, the better opinion is that the former
have priority, even thou.gh their service be anterior in time: The
E. A. Bernard, cited supra; The John T. lMoore, 3 Wood's R.
61. See, contra, qThe Daniel Brown, 9 Benedict 309; and also
The General Burnside, 3 Fed. Rep. 228; The De Wolf, Id. 236.
As between various material-men claiming under a quasi maritime
lien, the rule of priority, given by the admiralty law, will govern,
notwithstanding the provisions of the state act; Underwriters'
I Abbott on Shipping, 12th ed., p. 596, and note. But the lien for salvage will
take precedence over claims for wages earned before the accident, and it would seem
that though the lien for wages earned prior to the accident is not absolutely extin-
guished, it continues subject to the salvor's lien. The lien for salvage takes prece-
dence over that for general average: The Spaulding, 1 Brown's Ad. IR. 310;
Collins v. The Fort Wayne, 1 Bond 476; The Fanny, 2 Lowell 508.
